In the wake of Adnan Ahmadzade’s arrest, reports indicate that shares of “Oilmar Shipping and Chartering DMCC”, a UAE-based company allegedly linked to him, were acquired by the company’s CEO, Yusif Mammadov. While this development has been noted in various sources, any legal responsibility remains subject to determination by competent authorities.

According to information referenced in ongoing investigations, authorities may be examining the company’s financial flows and operational structure. However, no final legal conclusions have been issued at this time.

Since 2022, several UAE-based commodity trading companies have reportedly established a presence in Geneva, a major global trading hub. Among them is Oilmar DMCC, alongside other firms such as Tamal Trading and Logistics and Mahsul Trading & Services.

Experts note that Geneva continues to attract trading firms due to its infrastructure and financial ecosystem. As Professor Luciani of the University of Geneva has stated, the city remains a central commodities hub in Europe.

Analysis of the figures:

• Oilmar: In the 2023 financial year, Oilmar’s sales volume increased by 10% to 61.3 million tons, but the company’s profit fell from $1.56 billion in 2022 to $992.7 million.

• SOCAR: SOCAR’s total annual profit for 2023 amounted to $1.8 billion, which is only about $800 million more than Oilmar’s profit.

Albanian Police Intercept Oil Smuggling Operation Linked to Russia and Azerbaijan

In February 2023, Albanian authorities intercepted 22,500 tons of oil at the Port of Durrës. Initial reports described the shipment as Libyan-flagged, yet official documents, satellite tracking, and investigative reporting reveal that the cargo originated from Novorossiysk, Russia.

During the investigation, authorities confirmed that the tanker’s captain is a Russian national, Alexey Smaznov. Captain Smaznov told investigators that he works on a vessel owned by a Libyan company (though the ship sails under the Liberian flag). He was able to provide a convincing explanation regarding the delivery address of the cargo and the lack of a certificate of origin for the shipment. The captain stated that he was merely the transporter and added that the oil product on board had been ordered by some Albanian and UAE (Maddox DMCC & OilMar Dmcc) companies.

Subsequently, police identified the client company as AV International Group, owned by Piro Bare, who is involved in the hydrocarbons business, and managed by Orledia Bare. Orledia Bare, as previously mentioned, serves as one of the company’s managers. Based on this information, Durres authorities contacted businessman Piro Bare and visited the AV International Group office.

Piro Bare explained to police that he was negotiating with companies from Malta and the United Arab Emirates to purchase a certain amount of oil for delivery to Albania. He stated that the company he had ordered from and exchanged several emails with is called Ses Dmch Group. According to Bare, the oil was sourced from Russia, but the company’s documents falsely indicated Libya as the country of origin.

The sequence of events leading up to the police operation was as follows: when the vessel entered the Adriatic Sea, Piro Bare submitted documents to the Durres port customs for unloading the cargo into containers at Albania’s Porto Romano. Due to document issues, Bare could not clear customs and decided to cancel the delivery because of the complicated procedures at Durres port. Meanwhile, the tanker, suspected of originating from Russia, remained at sea and was subsequently seized.

Further details clarify the origin of the tanker FIDAN, allegedly arriving from Azerbaijan. According to Albanian police, the FIDAN (IMO: 9423736) is a chemical tanker built in 2009, currently sailing under the Turkish flag. Officials note that the executives of Maddox DMCC, OilMar DMCC,Socar Trading,Almedia(Turkey) involved in the operation, are all from Azerbaijan.

It was reported that the cargo was delivered to a Greek port by the FIDAN, which had been loaded on January 20 in the Russian port of Novorossiysk. This information aligns with data released by a cargo and vessel-tracking center.

CNN Albania

The Durres prosecutor’s office states that the ship was managed by an Azerbaijani company and that the oil had been loaded from the Russian port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea. Albanian media have expressed surprise that Azerbaijan was mentioned in such a controversial operation

Oilmar Dmcc and Maddox Dmcc Albania 22500 ton Russian oil

According to the Albanian Police report, the operation involved the Economic and Financial Crime Unit in Durres, which had received information about a Liberian-flagged vessel involved in smuggling a large quantity of oil. Based on this intelligence, authorities organized a police operation, codenamed “Embargo”, preventing the vessel from transporting oil to Albania using forged documents. The shipment was suspected to originate from countries under oil embargo, specifically Russia via the port of Novorossiysk.

 SKEMA/ Who is behind and how was the embargo on Russian oil broken in Albania?

The operation involved sophisticated ship-to-ship (STS) transfers in Greek territorial waters, falsification of certificates of origin, and coordination among multiple offshore companies.

Oilmar Dmcc and Maddox Dmcc in Albania 22500 ton Russian oil

The companies identified in these operations include Oilmar Shipping DMCC (Dubai), Maddox DMCC, Almedia (Turkey), and SOCAR Trading. Certain investigative reports have referenced these entities in the context of complex oil trading activities involving shipments that may have originated from Russia. However, no court has established any violation of UN or EU sanctions by these companies.

Albania 22500 ton Russian from Azeebaijani oil trader

The 2023 Durrës Operation

According to Albanian police reports and media investigations:

• The oil cargo was 22,500 tons, loaded onto the vessel “Grace Felix”, registered under a Libyan flag to obscure its true origin.

• Satellite tracking shows the oil was initially loaded onto the “FIDAN” vessel in Novorossiysk, Russia.

• Subsequently, the oil was transferred STS in the Greece’s Lakonikos Gulf to the “Grace Felix” to conceal its Russian origin.

• Certificates of origin were falsified to claim a non-Russian source, enabling the shipment to bypass sanctions that Albania and the EU have imposed on Russian energy imports.

The operation demonstrates a sophisticated cross-border oil smuggling network, combining maritime logistics expertise, offshore corporate structures, and document manipulation to evade international oversight.

Companies and Ownership Structure

The key corporate actors in this operation are:

1. Oilmar Shipping DMCC (Dubai): A relatively young trading company, primarily focused on buying, selling, and transporting oil and petroleum products globally. Oilmar’s structure allows flexible operations and high profit margins, often through offshore arrangements.

2. Maddox DMCC : Acts as a regional logistics and trading facilitator, reportedly coordinating shipments from the Eastern Mediterranean to European ports.

3. Almedia (Turkey): Another affiliate used to navigate regional shipping regulations.

4. SOCAR Trading While SOCAR is a large state-owned enterprise with extensive upstream and downstream operations, these subsidiaries reportedly enabled parts of the trading network. The relationship between SOCAR and these offshore entities raises serious questions about corporate oversight and regulatory compliance.

According to an official post by the Albanian State Police and related police reports, a coded police operation “Embargo” was launched in Durrës, resulting in the interception of a Liberian-flagged vessel carrying 22 500 tons of oil amid documentation that raised suspicions about origin and compliance.

Legal and Regulatory Implications

The Durrës case raises multiple serious legal issues:

1. Sanctions Evasion: UN and EU sanctions prohibit the import of Russian oil under specific conditions. Misrepresenting origin violates these sanctions.

2. Document Forgery: Certificates of origin were allegedly falsified in Greek territorial waters. Forgery of trade documents is a criminal offense under multiple jurisdictions.

3. Money Laundering Risk: Offshore corporate structures and complex financial transfers may conceal illicit profits.

4. Maritime Law Violations: STS operations in territorial waters must comply with port state control regulations. Failure to do so may constitute a breach of international maritime law.

5. Corporate Oversight: SOCAR Trading’s indirect involvement raises questions about the state-owned entity’s responsibility for compliance and ethical trading practices.

Comparing Oilmar and SOCAR

The contrast between Oilmar and SOCAR illustrates how corporate structure and operational focus impact profitability and legal exposure:

• Section: Profit Paradox – SOCAR vs Oilmar

• One of the most striking observations in the 2023 Albania case is the profit disparity between SOCAR’s state-backed operations and small trading firms like Oilmar.

• SOCAR: Owns and operates large-scale production and refining assets, including Petkim, STAR refinery, and two additional oil refining facilities in Azerbaijan and the Caspian region. SOCAR’s combined annual crude oil production reaches over 500 million barrels, yet the net profit reported by the state-owned company is relatively modest, around $500 million annually, after accounting for operational costs, capital expenditures, and regional development investments.

• Oilmar DMMC / Adnan Ahmedzade’s proxy companies: In contrast, in just four years, these small, agile, offshore trading firms reportedly,trades Russian crude oil , achieved $1 billion in net profit. Their model focuses on high-margin trading, ship-to-ship transfers, and offshore structuring, allowing them to circumvent capital-intensive investments, operational overhead, and regulatory transparency required of SOCAR.

• This stark contrast raises multiple questions:

• Profit Concentration in Trading: How can relatively small proxy companies generate twice the net profit of a large state-owned corporation with massive upstream and refining capacity?

• Regulatory Oversight: Are state-owned entities adequately monitoring the trading activities of affiliated or proxy companies abroad?

• Sanctions and Compliance: Do aggressive trading schemes — such as the STS operations revealed in Albania — exploit gaps in EU and international sanctions enforcement to achieve outsized profits?

• In essence, the case demonstrates a profit paradox: large-scale production and refining operations with massive output and overhead generate smaller net profits, while small trading firms, leveraging complex international networks and regulatory gaps, can produce disproportionately high returns.

• Implication for Authorities: This discrepancy highlights the need for enhanced scrutiny of proxy companies, offshore trading structures, and cross-border operations, particularly when state-owned energy assets and public interest are indirectly involved..

Despite SOCAR’s scale and market presence, reports indicate that its indirect participation via affiliated entities enabled high-risk, high-profit operations similar to those executed by Oilmar, highlighting potential gaps in corporate oversight.

Why UK and EU Authorities Might Review the Investigation

Given the transnational nature of the reported operations and potential concerns related to EU sanctions and maritime regulations:

• Transnational Operations: According to investigative reports, oil shipments reportedly moved from Russia → Aegean Sea → Albania (and potentially Spain), involving multiple jurisdictions.

• Document Concerns: Certificates of origin were reported to have inconsistencies, suggesting the cargo’s stated origin may differ from its actual source.

• Maritime Safety and Compliance: Ship-to-ship (STS) operations in territorial waters are subject to regulatory oversight, and any non-compliance is under review.

• Financial Oversight: Reports indicate that offshore corporate structures were used in these operations, highlighting the need for thorough financial review.

• Public Accountability: Changes in corporate ownership or leadership do not automatically address questions regarding transparency or regulatory compliance.

According to Albanian police reports and publicly available investigative sources, certain companies — including Oilmar Shipping and Chartering DMCC, Maddox DMCC, Almedia (Turkey), and SOCAR Trading — were reportedly involved in the operations at the Port of Durrës. These mentions remain allegations and have not been adjudicated in any court. Any potential testimony or investigation by local authorities, including Azerbaijani authorities, would be determined by competent legal institutions.

Renewed review by relevant authorities could help clarify compliance with EU sanctions, improve corporate transparency, and strengthen oversight of cross-border trading operations.

Call to Action

Public awareness and regulatory vigilance are important. Relevant authorities may wish to review available information:

• UK authorities: National Crime Agency (NCA) and Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI)

• EU authorities: Europol, European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and European Commission (Sanctions/EEAS)

• Albanian authorities: Port of Durrës, Prosecution, and Financial Intelligence Unit

The 2023 Durrës case has been reported as involving multiple companies and shipments of oil under complex arrangements. Observers note the importance of transparency, accountability, and rigorous enforcement of international trade and sanctions regulations.